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Abstract—The ability to exchange secret information is critical
to many commercial, governmental, and military networks. The
intrinsically secure communications graph (iS-graph) is a random
graph which describes the connections that can be securely
established over a large-scale network, by exploiting the physical
properties of the wireless medium. This paper provides an
overview of the main properties of this new class of random
graphs. We first analyze the local properties of the iS-graph,
namely the degree distributions and their dependence on fading,
target secrecy rate, and eavesdropper collusion. To mitigate
the effect of the eavesdroppers, we propose two techniques
that improve secure connectivity. Then, we analyze the global
properties of the iS-graph, namely percolation on the infinite
plane, and full connectivity on a finite region. These results help
clarify how the presence of eavesdroppers can compromise secure
communication in a large-scale network.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, wireless networks,
stochastic geometry, secrecy capacity, connectivity, percolation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary security systems for wireless networks are
based on cryptographic primitives that generally ignore two
key factors: (a) the physical properties of the wireless medium,
and (b) the spatial configuration of both the legitimate and
malicious nodes. These two factors are important since they
affect the communication channels between the nodes, which
in turn determine the fundamental secrecy limits of a wireless
network. In fact, the inherent randomness of the wireless
medium and the spatial location of the nodes can be leveraged
to provide intrinsic security of the communications infrastruc-
ture at the physical-layer level.1
The basis for information-theoretic security, which builds
on the notion of perfect secrecy [1], was laid in [2] and later
in [3], [4]. More recently, there has been a renewed interest
in information-theoretic security over wireless channels, from
the perspective of space-time communications [5], multiple-
input multiple-output communications [6]–[10], eavesdropper
collusion [11], [12], cooperative relay networks [13], fading
channels [14]–[18], strong secrecy [19], [20], secret key agree-
ment [21]–[25], code design [26]–[28], among other topics.
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1In the literature, the term “security” typically encompasses 3 different
characteristics: secrecy (or privacy), integrity, and authenticity. This paper
does not consider the issues of integrity or authenticity, and the terms
“secrecy” and “security” are used interchangeably.
A comprehensive treatment of physical-layer security can be
found in [29]. A fundamental limitation of the literature is that
it only considers scenarios with a small number of nodes. To
account for large-scale networks composed of multiple legiti-
mate and eavesdropper nodes, secrecy graphs were introduced
in [30] from a geometrical perspective, and in [31] from an
information-theoretic perspective. The local connectivity of
secrecy graphs was extensively characterized in [32], while the
scaling laws of the secrecy capacity were presented in [33],
[34]. The feasibility of long-range secure communication was
proved in [35], in the context of continuum percolation.
In this paper, we present an overview of secure communi-
cation over large-scale networks, in terms of the properties of
the underlying random graph. The main contributions are as
follows:
• Framework for intrinsic security in stochastic networks:
We introduce an information-theoretic definition of the
intrinsically secure communications graph (iS-graph),
based on the notion of strong secrecy.
• Local connectivity in the iS-graph: We provide a proba-
bilistic characterization of both in-degree and out-degree
of a typical node.
• Techniques for communication with enhanced secrecy:
We propose sectorized transmission and eavesdropper
neutralization as two techniques for enhancing the secrecy
of communication.
• Maximum secrecy rate (MSR) in the iS-graph: We pro-
vide a probabilistic characterization of the MSR between
a typical legitimate node and each of its neighbors.
• The case of colluding eavesdroppers: We quantify the
degradation in secure connectivity arising from eaves-
droppers collusion.
• Percolation in the iS-graph: We prove the existence
of a phase transition in the Poisson iS-graph, showing
that long-range communication is still possible when a
secrecy constraint is present.
• Full connectivity in the iS-graph: We characterize se-
cure full connectivity on a finite region of the Poisson
iS-graph.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
system model. Section III characterizes local connectivity in
the Poisson iS-graph. Section IV analyzes two techniques for
enhancing the secrecy of communication. Section V considers
the MSR between a node and its neighbours. Section VI
characterizes the case of colluding eavesdroppers. Section VII
characterizes continuum percolation in the Poisson iS-graph
defined over the infinite plane. Section VIII analyzes full
connectivity in the Poisson iS-graph restricted to a finite
region. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Wireless Propagation Characteristics
In a wireless environment, the received power Prx(xi, xj)
associated with the link −−→xixj can modeled as
Prx(xi, xj) = Pℓ · g(xi, xj , Zxi,xj ), (1)
where Pℓ is the (common) transmit power of the legiti-
mate nodes; and g(xi, xj , Zxi,xj ) is the power gain of the
link −−→xixj , where the random variable (RV) Zxi,xj represents
the random propagation effects (such as multipath fading or
shadowing) associated with link −−→xixj . We consider that the
Zxi,xj , xi 6= xj are independent identically distributed (IID)
RVs with common probability density function (PDF) fZ(z),
and that Zxi,xj = Zxj,xi due to channel reciprocity. The chan-
nel gain g(xi, xj , Zxi,xj) is considered constant (quasi-static)
throughout the use of the communications channel, which
corresponds to channels with a large coherence time. The gain
function is assumed to satisfy the following conditions:
1) g(xi, xj , Zxi,xj) depends on xi and xj only through the
link length |xi − xj |; with abuse of notation, we can
write g(r, z) , g(xi, xj , z)||xi−xj |→r.2
2) g(r, z) is continuous and strictly decreasing in r.
3) limr→∞ g(r, z) = 0.
The proposed model is general enough to account for common
choices of g. One example is the unbounded model where
g(r, z) = zr2b . The term
1
r2b accounts for the far-field path
loss with distance, where the amplitude loss exponent b is
environment-dependent and can approximately range from
0.8 (e.g., hallways inside buildings) to 4 (e.g., dense urban
environments), with b = 1 corresponding to free space
propagation. Another example is the bounded model where
g(r, z) = z1+r2b , which eliminates the singularity at the origin,
but often leads to intractable analytical results [36]. Further-
more, by appropriately choosing of the distribution of Zxi,xj ,
both models can account for various random propagation
effects, including Nakagami-m fading, Rayleigh fading, and
log-normal shadowing [37].
B. iS-Graph
Consider a wireless network where legitimate nodes and
potential eavesdroppers are randomly scattered in space, ac-
cording to some point process. The iS-graph is a convenient
representation of the information-theoretically secure links that
can be established on such network, and is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (iS-Graph [31]): Let Πℓ = {xi} ⊂ Rd
denote the set of legitimate nodes, and Πe = {ei} ⊂ Rd
denote the set of eavesdroppers. The iS-graph is the directed
graph G = {Πℓ, E} with vertex set Πℓ and edge set
E = {−−→xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺}, (2)
where ̺ is a threshold representing the prescribed infimum
secrecy rate for each communication link; and Rs(xi, xj) is
2For notational simplicity, when Z = 1, we omit the second argument of
the function g(r, z) and simply use g(r).
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Figure 1. Example of an iS-graph on R2.
the maximum secrecy rate (MSR) of the link −−→xixj , given by
Rs(xi, xj) =
[
log2
(
1 +
Prx(xi, xj)
σ2ℓ
)
− log2
(
1 +
Prx(xi, e
∗)
σ2e
)]+
(3)
in bits per complex dimension, where [x]+ = max{x, 0};
σ2ℓ , σ
2
e are the noise powers of the legitimate users and
eavesdroppers, respectively; and e∗ = argmax
ek∈Πe
Prx(xi, ek).
3
This definition presupposes that the eavesdroppers are not
allowed to collude (i.e., they cannot exchange or combine
information), and therefore only the eavesdropper with the
strongest received signal from xi determines the MSR between
xi and xj .
The iS-graph admits an outage interpretation, in the sense
that legitimate nodes set a target secrecy rate ̺ at which they
transmit without knowing the channel state information (CSI)
of the legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers. In this context,
an edge between two nodes signifies that the corresponding
channel is not in secrecy outage.
Consider now the particular scenario where the following
conditions hold: (a) the infimum desired secrecy rate is zero,
i.e., ̺ = 0; (b) the wireless environment introduces only path
loss, i.e., Zxi,xj = 1 in (1); and (c) the noise powers of
the legitimate users and eavesdroppers are equal, i.e., σ2ℓ =
σ2e = σ
2
. Note that by setting ̺ = 0, we are considering the
existence of secure links, in the sense that an edge −−→xixj is
present if and only if Rs(xi, xj) > 0. Under these special
conditions, the edge set in (2) simplifies to
E =
{−−→xixj : |xi− xj | < |xi− e∗|, e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|
}
,
(4)
which corresponds the geometrical model proposed in [30].
Fig. 1 shows an example of such an iS-graph on R2.
The spatial location of the legitimate and eavesdropper
nodes can be modeled either deterministically or stochastically.
In many cases, the node positions are unknown to the network
designer a priori, so they may be treated as uniformly random
according to a Poisson point process [37]–[40].
Definition 2.2 (Poisson iS-graph): The Poisson iS-graph
is an iS-graph where Πℓ,Πe ⊂ Rd are mutually independent,
homogeneous Poisson point processes with densities λℓ and
λe, respectively.
In the remainder of the paper (unless otherwise indicated),
we focus on Poisson iS-graphs in R2.
3This definition uses strong secrecy as the condition for information-
theoretic security. See [19], [32] for more details.
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Figure 2. In-degree of a node. In this example, the node at the origin can
receive messages with information-theoretic security from Nin = 2 nodes.
The RV A is the area of a typical Voronoi cell, induced by the eavesdropper
Poisson process Πe with density λe.
III. LOCAL CONNECTIVITY IN THE POISSON iS-GRAPH
The iS-graph is a random graph, and therefore the in-
and out-degrees of the legitimate nodes are RVs. In this
section, we provide a probabilistic characterization of both
in-degree Nin and out-degree Nout of a typical node in the
Poisson iS-graph.4 We first consider the simplest case of
̺ = 0 (the existence of secure links), Zxi,xj = 1 (path loss
only), and σ2e = σ2ℓ (equal noise powers) in Sections III-A,
III-B, and III-C. This scenario leads to an iS-graph with a
simple geometric description, thus providing various insights
that are useful in understanding more complex cases. Later,
in Sections III-D and III-E, we separately analyze how the
node degrees are affected by wireless propagation effects other
than path loss (e.g., multipath fading), a non-zero secrecy rate
threshold ̺, and unequal noise powers σ2e , σ2ℓ .
A. In-Degree Characterization
The following theorem uncovers a surprising connection
between a node’s in-degree and the area of a typical cell in a
Poisson-Voronoi tessellation.
Theorem 3.1 ([31]): The in-degree Nin of a typical node
in the Poisson iS-graph has the following moment generating
function (MGF)
MNin(s) = E
{
exp
(
λℓ
λe
A˜(es − 1)
)}
, (5)
where A˜ is the area of a typical Voronoi cell induced by a
unit-density Poisson process. Furthermore, all the moments of
Nin are given by
E{Nnin} =
n∑
k=1
(
λℓ
λe
)k
S(n, k)E{A˜k}, n ≥ 1, (6)
4In this paper, we analyze the local properties of a typical node in the
Poisson iS-graph. This notion is made precise in [39, Sec. 4.4] using Palm
theory.
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Figure 3. Out-degree of a node. In this example, the node at the origin can
transmit messages with information-theoretic security to Nout = 3 nodes.
where S(n, k), 1 ≤ k ≤ n, are the Stirling numbers of the
second kind [41, Ch. 24].
Figure 2 illustrates the in-degree of a legitimate node.
Equation (6) expresses the moments of Nin in terms of the
moments of A˜. In general, E{A˜k} cannot be obtained in closed
form, except in the case of k = 1 where E{A˜} = 1. For k = 2
and k = 3, E{A˜k} can be expressed as multiple integrals and
then computed numerically [42]. Alternatively, the moments of
A˜ can be determined using Monte Carlo simulation of random
Poisson-Voronoi tessellations [43].
The above theorem can be used to obtain other in-
connectivity properties, as given in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1: The average in-degree of a typical node in
the Poisson iS-graph is
E{Nin} = λℓ
λe
(7)
and the probability that a typical node cannot receive from
anyone with positive secrecy rate (in-isolation) is
pin−isol = E
{
e−
λℓ
λe
A˜
}
. (8)
B. Out-Degree Characterization
Theorem 3.2 ([30], [31]): The out-degree Nout of a typical
node in the Poisson iS-graph has the following geometric
probability mass function (PMF)
pNout(n) =
(
λℓ
λℓ + λe
)n(
λe
λℓ + λe
)
, n ≥ 0. (9)
Figure 3 illustrates the out-degree of a node. The above the-
orem can be used to obtain other out-connectivity properties,
as given in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2: The average out-degree of a typical node in
the Poisson iS-graph is
E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
, (10)
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Figure 4. PMF of the in- and out-degree of a node ( λe
λℓ
= 0.4). The vertical
line marks the average node degrees, E{Nout} = E{Nin} = λℓλe = 2.5, in
accordance with Property 3.1.
and the probability that a typical node cannot transmit to
anyone with positive secrecy rate (out-isolation) is
pout−isol =
λe
λℓ + λe
. (11)
C. General Relationships Between In- and Out-Degree
We have so far considered the probabilistic distribution of
the in- and out-degrees in a separate fashion. This section
establishes a direct comparison between some characteristics
of the in- and out-degrees.
Property 3.1 ([32]): For the Poisson iS-graph with λℓ > 0
and λe > 0, the average degrees of a typical node satisfy
E{Nin} = E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
. (12)
Furthermore, we can establish the following relationship
between the probabilities of in- and out-isolation.
Property 3.2 ([32]): For the Poisson iS-graph with λℓ > 0
and λe > 0, the probabilities of in- and out-isolation of a
typical node satisfy
pin−isol < pout−isol. (13)
An intuitive explanation for this property is provided in [32].
Figure 4 compares the PMFs of the in- and out-degree of a
node, while Figure 5 compares the probabilities of in- and
out-isolation for various ratios λeλℓ .
D. Effect of the Wireless Propagation Characteristics
We have so far analyzed the local connectivity of the
iS-graph in the presence of path loss only. However, the wire-
less medium typically introduces random propagation effects
such as multipath fading and shadowing, which are modeled
by the RV Zxi,xj in (1). Considering ̺ = 0, σ2ℓ = σ2e = σ2,
and arbitrary propagation effects Zxi,xj with PDF fZ(z), we
can combine (2) with the general propagation model of (1) to
obtain the edge set
E = {−−→xixj : g(|xi−xj |, Zxi,xj) > g(|xi−e∗|, Zxi,e∗)}, (14)
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Figure 5. Probabilities of in- and out-isolation of a node, versus the ratio λe
λℓ
.
Note that pin−isol < pout−isol for any fixed λeλℓ , according to Property 3.2.
where
e∗ = argmax
ek∈Πe
g(|xi − ek|, Zxi,ek).
Unlike the case of path-loss only, where the out-connections
of a node are determined only by the closest eavesdropper,
here they are determined by the eavesdropper with the least
attenuated channel. The following theorem characterizes the
distribution of the out-degree.
Theorem 3.3 ([32]): For the Poisson iS-graph with prop-
agation effects Zxi,xj whose PDF is given by a continuous
function fZ(z), the PMF of the out-degree Nout of a typical
node is given in (9), and is invariant with respect to fZ(z).
Intuitively, the propagation environment affects both the
legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers in the same way, such that
the PMF of Nout is invariant with respect to the PDF fZ(z).
However, the PMF of Nin does depend on fZ(z) in a non-
trivial way, although its mean remains the same, as specified
in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3: For the Poisson iS-graph with propagation
effects Zxi,xj distributed according to fZ(z), the average node
degrees are
E{Nin} = E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
, (15)
for any distribution fZ(z).
We thus conclude that the expected node degrees are
invariant with respect to the distribution characterizing the
propagation effects.
E. Effect of the Secrecy Rate Threshold and Noise Powers
In this section, we study the effect of non-zero secrecy rate
threshold, i.e., ̺ > 0, and unequal noise powers, i.e., σ2ℓ 6=
σ2e , on the iS-graph. Considering Zxi,xj = 1 and arbitrary
noise powers σ2ℓ , σ2e , we can combine (2) with the general
propagation model of (1) and obtain the edge set
E =
{−−→xixj : g(|xi−xj |) > σ2ℓ
σ2e
2̺g(|xi− e∗|)+ σ
2
ℓ
Pℓ
(2̺− 1)
}
,
(16)
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Figure 6. Average node degree versus the secrecy rate threshold ̺, for
various values of Pℓ/σ2 (σ2ℓ = σ2e = σ2 , g(r) = 1r2b , b = 2, λℓ = 1m−2,
λe = 0.1m−2).
where
e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe
|xi − ek|.
Note that by setting ̺ = 0 and σ2ℓ = σ2e in (16) we obtain
the edge set in (4) as a special case. The exact dependence of
the average node degree on the parameters ̺, σ2ℓ , σ2e depends
on the function g(r). To gain further insights, we consider the
specific channel gain function
g(r) =
1
r2b
, r > 0. (17)
This function has been widely used in the literature to model
path loss behavior as a function of distance, and satisfies the
conditions in Section II-A. The following theorem character-
izes the average degrees of the resulting iS-graph.
Theorem 3.4 ([32]): For the Poisson iS-graph with secrecy
rate threshold ̺, noise powers σ2ℓ , σ2e , and channel gain func-
tion g(r) = 1r2b , the average node degrees are
E{Nin} = E{Nout}
= π2λℓλe
∫ ∞
0
xe−πλex(
σ2
ℓ
σ2e
2̺ +
σ2
ℓ
Pℓ
(2̺ − 1)xb
)1/b dx (18)
Figure 6 illustrates the effect of the secrecy rate threshold ̺
on the average node degrees. We observe that the average node
degree attains its maximum value of λℓλe = 10 at ̺ = 0, and
is monotonically decreasing with ̺.
IV. TECHNIQUES FOR COMMUNICATION WITH ENHANCED
SECRECY
Based on the results derived in Section III, we observe
that even a small density of eavesdroppers is enough to
significantly disrupt connectivity of the iS-graph. For example,
if the density of eavesdroppers is half the density of legitimate
nodes, then from (12) the average node degree is only λℓλe = 2.
In this section, we propose two techniques—sectorized trans-
mission and eavesdropper neutralization—which achieve an
average degree higher than λℓλe .
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Figure 7. Secure communication with sectorized transmission. In this
example with L = 4 sectors, the node at the origin can transmit messages
with information-theoretic security to Nout = 5 nodes.
A. Sectorized Transmission
We have so far assumed that the legitimate nodes employ
omnidirectional antennas, distributing power equally among
all directions. We now consider that each legitimate node is
able to transmit independently in L sectors of the plane, with
L ≥ 1, as depicted in Figure 7. This can be accomplished, for
example, through the use of L directional antennas. With each
node xi ∈ Πℓ, we associate L transmission sectors {S(l)i }Ll=1,
defined as
S(l)i ,
{
z ∈ R2 : φi + (l − 1)2π
L
< ∠−→xiz < φi + l2π
L
}
for l = 1 . . . L, where {φi}∞i=1 are random offset angles with
an arbitrary joint distribution. The resulting iS-graph GL =
{Πℓ, EL} has an edge set given by
EL = {−−→xixj : |xi − xj | < |xi − e∗|},
where
e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe∩S∗
|xi − ek|, S∗ =
{
S(l)i : xj ∈ S(l)i
}
.
Here, S∗ is the transmission sector of xi that contains the
destination node xj , and e∗ is the eavesdropper inside S∗
that is closest to the transmitter xi. The following theorem
characterizes the average node degree as a function of L.
Theorem 4.1 (Sectorized Transmission [44]): For the Pois-
son iS-graph GL with L sectors, the average node degrees
are
E{Nin} = E{Nout} = Lλℓ
λe
. (19)
We conclude that the average node degree increases linearly
with the number of sectors L, and hence sectorized transmis-
sion is an effective technique for enhancing the secrecy of
communications. Figure 7 provides an intuitive understanding
of why sectorization works. Specifically, if there was no
sectorization, node 0 would be out-isolated, due to the close
proximity of the eavesdropper in sector S(4). However, if we
allow independent transmissions in four non-overlapping sec-
tors, that same eavesdropper can only hear the transmissions
PSfrag replacements
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Figure 8. Secure communication with eavesdropper neutralization. In this
example, the node at the origin can transmit messages with information-
theoretic security to Nout = 5 nodes.
inside sector S(4). Thus, even though node 0 is out-isolated
with respect to sector S(4), it may still communicate securely
with some legitimate nodes inside sectors S(1), S(2), and S(3).
B. Eavesdropper Neutralization
In some scenarios, each legitimate node may be able to
physically inspect its surroundings and deactivate the eaves-
droppers falling inside some neutralization region. With each
node xi ∈ Πℓ, we associate a neutralization region Θi inside
which all eavesdroppers have been deactivated. The total
neutralization region Θ can then be seen as a Boolean model
with points {xi} and associated sets {Θi}, i.e.,
Θ =
∞⋃
i=1
(xi +Θi).
Since the eavesdroppers inside Θ have been deactivated, the
effective eavesdropper process after neutralization is Πe ∩ Θ,
where Θ , R2\Θ denotes the complement of Θ. The resulting
iS-graph GΘ = {Πℓ, EΘ} has an edge set given by
EΘ =
{−−→xixj : |xi−xj | < |xi−e∗|, e∗ = argmin
ek∈Πe∩Θ
|xi−ek|
}
.
In the following, we consider the case of a circular neu-
tralization set, i.e, Θi = B0(ρ) where ρ is a deterministic
neutralization radius, as depicted in Fig. 8.
Theorem 4.2 (Eavesdropper Neutralization [44]): For the
enhanced Poisson iS-graph Gρ with neutralization radius ρ,
the average node degrees of a typical node are lower-bounded
by
E{Nin} = E{Nout} ≥ λℓ
λe
(
πλeρ
2 + eπλℓρ
2
)
. (20)
We conclude that the average node degree increases at a
rate that is at least exponential with the neutralization radius ρ,
making eavesdropper neutralization an effective technique for
enhancing the secrecy of communications.
Figure 9 plots the average node degree versus the neutral-
ization radius ρ, for various values of λe. We observe that the
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Figure 9. Average node degree versus the neutralization radius ρ, for various
values of λe (λℓ = 1m−2).
analytical lower-bound for E{Nout} given in (20) is very close
to the actual value of E{Nout} obtained through Monte Carlo
simulation, becoming tight as ρ→ 0 or λe →∞.
V. MAXIMUM SECRECY RATE IN THE POISSON iS-GRAPH
In this section, we analyze the MSR between a node and
each of its neighbours. Considering the coordinate system
depicted in Fig. 3 and the channel gain g(r) = 1
r2b
, the
MSR Rs,i between the node at the origin and its i-th closest
neighbour, i ≥ 1, can be written for a given realization of the
node positions Πℓ and Πe as
Rs,i =
[
log2
(
1 +
Pℓ
R2bℓ,iσ
2
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pℓ
R2be,1σ
2
)]+
(21)
in bits per complex dimension. For each instantiation of the
random Poisson processes Πℓ and Πe, a realization of the
RV Rs,i is obtained. The following theorem provides the
distribution of this RV.
Theorem 5.1 ([31]): The MSR Rs,i between a typical node
and its i-th closest neighbour, i ≥ 1, is a RV whose cumulative
distribution function (CDF) FRs,i(̺) is given by
FRs,i(̺) = 1−
ln 2(πλℓ)
i
(i− 1)!b
(
Pℓ
σ2
) i
b
∫ +∞
̺
2z
(2z − 1)1+ ib
× exp
−πλℓ
(
Pℓ
σ2
2z − 1
) 1
b
− πλe
(
Pℓ
σ2
2z−̺ − 1
) 1
b
 dz,
(22)
for ̺ ≥ 0.
From this result, we can trivially obtain the probability of
existence of a non-zero MSR, and the probability of secrecy
outage.
Corollary 5.1: Considering the link between a typical node
and its i-th closest neighbour, i ≥ 1, the probability of
existence of a non-zero MSR, pexist,i = P{Rs,i > 0}, is
pexist,i =
(
λℓ
λℓ + λe
)i
(23)
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Figure 10. Probability poutage,i of secrecy outage between a node and its i-
th closest neighbour, for various values of the neighbour index i (λℓ = 1m−2,
λe = 0.1m−2, b = 2, Pℓ/σ
2 = 10).
and the probability of an outage in MSR is poutage,i(̺) =
P{Rs,i < ̺} = FRs,i(̺), as given in (22).
Figure 10 shows the probability poutage,i of secrecy outage
of a typical node transmitting to its i-th neighbour, as a
function of the desired secrecy rate ̺. As expected, a secrecy
outage become more likely as we increase the target secrecy
rate ̺ set by the transmitter.
VI. THE CASE OF COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
In this section, we consider that the eavesdroppers have
ability to collude, i.e., they can exchange and combine the
information received by all the eavesdroppers to decode the
secret message. The following theorem characterizes the re-
sulting average node degree in such graph.
Theorem 6.1 ([32]): For the Poisson iS-graph with collud-
ing eavesdroppers, secrecy rate threshold ̺ = 0, equal noise
powers σ2ℓ = σ2e , and channel gain function g(r) = 1r2b , b > 1,
the average degrees of a typical node are
E{Nin} = E{Nout} = λℓ
λe
sinc
(
1
b
)
, (24)
where sinc(x) , sin(πx)πx .
It is insightful to rewrite (24) as E{Nout|colluding} =
E{Nout|non-colluding} · η(b), where η(b) = sinc
(
1
b
)
, and
η(b) < 1 for b > 1. The function η(b) can be interpreted
as the degradation factor in average connectivity due to
eavesdropper collusion. In the extreme where b = 1, we have
complete loss of secure connectivity with η(1) = 0. This
is because the series Prx,e =
∑∞
i=1
Pℓ
R2be,i
diverges (i.e., the
total received eavesdropper power is infinite), so the resulting
average node degree is zero. In the other extreme where
b → ∞, we achieve the highest secure connectivity with
η(∞) = 1. This is because the first term Pℓ
R2be,1
in the Prx,e
series (corresponding to the non-colluding term) is dominant,
so the average node degree in the colluding case approaches
the non-colluding one.
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Figure 11. Normalized average node degree of the iS-graph, E{Nout}
λℓ/λe
,
versus the amplitude loss exponent b, for the cases of colluding and non-
colluding eavesdroppers.
Figure 11 quantifies the (normalized) average node degree
of the iS-graph, E{Nout}λℓ/λe , versus the amplitude loss exponent b.
As predicted analytically, it is apparent that cluttered envi-
ronments with larger amplitude loss exponents b are more
favorable for secure communication, in the sense that in such
environments collusion only provides a marginal performance
improvement for the eavesdroppers.
VII. PERCOLATION IN THE POISSON iS-GRAPH
Percolation theory studies the existence of phase transitions
in random graphs, whereby an infinite cluster of connected
nodes suddenly arises as some system parameter is varied. Per-
colation theory has been used to study connectivity of multi-
hop wireless networks, where the formation of an unbounded
cluster is desirable for communication over arbitrarily long
distances [45]–[47]. In this section, we prove the existence of
a phase transition in the Poisson iS-graph, showing that long-
range communication in a wireless network is still possible
when a secrecy constraint is present.
A. Definitions
Graphs: We use G = {Πℓ, E} to denote the (directed)
iS-graph with vertex set Πℓ and edge set given in (2).
In addition, we define two undirected graphs: the weak
iS-graph Gweak = {Πℓ, Eweak}, where
Eweak = {xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺ ∨Rs(xj , xi) > ̺},
and the strong iS-graph Gstrong = {Πℓ, Estrong}, where
Estrong = {xixj : Rs(xi, xj) > ̺ ∧Rs(xj , xi) > ̺}.
Graph Components: We use the notation x G→ y to represent
a path from node x to node y in a directed graph G, and x G∗— y
to represent a path between node x and node y in an undirected
graph G∗. We define four components:
Kout(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃x G→ y}, (25)
Kin(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃ y G→x}, (26)
Kweak(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃x Gweak— y}, (27)
Kstrong(x) , {y ∈ Πℓ : ∃x Gstrong— y}. (28)
Percolation Probabilities: To study percolation in the
iS-graph, it is useful to define percolation probabilities asso-
ciated with the four graph components. Specifically, let pout∞ ,
pin∞, p
weak
∞ , and pstrong∞ respectively be the probabilities that the
in, out, weak, and strong components containing node x = 0
have an infinite number of nodes, i.e.,
p⋄∞(λℓ, λe, ̺) , P{|K⋄(0)| =∞}
for ⋄ ∈ {out, in,weak, strong}.5
B. Main Result
Typically, a continuum percolation model consists of an
underlying point process defined on the infinite plane, and
a rule that describes how connections are established between
the nodes [48]. A main property of all percolation models
is that they exhibit a phase transition as some continuous
parameter is varied. If this parameter is the density λ of nodes,
then the phase transition occurs at some critical density λc.
When λ < λc, denoted as the subcritical phase, all the clusters
are a.s. bounded.6 When λ > λc, denoted as the supercritical
phase, the graph exhibits a.s. an unbounded cluster of nodes,
or in other words, the graph percolates.
We now determine if percolation in the iS-graph is pos-
sible, and if so, for which combinations of system parame-
ters (λℓ, λe, ̺) does it occur. The mathematical characteriza-
tion of the iS-graph presents two challenges: i) the iS-graph
is a directed graph, which leads to the study of directed perco-
lation; and ii) the iS-graph exhibits dependencies between the
state of different edges, which leads to the study of dependent
percolation. The result is given by the following main theorem.
Theorem 7.1 (Phase Transition in the iS-Graph [35]):
For any λe > 0 and ̺ satisfying
0 ≤ ̺ < ̺max , log2
(
1 +
P · g(0)
σ2
)
, (29)
there exist critical densities λoutc , λinc , λweakc , λstrongc satisfying
0 < λweakc ≤ λoutc ≤ λstrongc <∞ (30)
0 < λweakc ≤ λinc ≤ λstrongc <∞ (31)
such that
p⋄∞ = 0, for λℓ < λ⋄c , (32)
p⋄∞ > 0, for λℓ > λ⋄c , (33)
for any ⋄ ∈ {out, in,weak, strong}. Conversely, if ̺ > ̺max,
then p⋄∞ = 0 for any λℓ, λe.
5Except where otherwise indicated, we use the symbol ⋄ to represent the
out, in, weak, or strong component.
6We say that an event occurs “almost surely” (a.s.) if its probability is equal
to one.
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Figure 12. Simulated percolation probabilities for the weak and strong
components of the iS-graph, versus the density λℓ of legitimate nodes
(λe = 1m−2, ̺ = 0).
Theorem 7.1 shows that each of the four components of
the iS-graph (in, out, weak, and strong) experiences a phase
transition at some nontrivial critical density λ⋄c of legitimate
nodes. In addition, it shows that percolation can occur for
any prescribed secrecy threshold ̺ satisfying ̺ < ̺max =
log2
(
1 + P ·g(0)σ2
)
, as long as the density of legitimate nodes
is made large enough. This implies that for unbounded path
loss models such as g(r) = 1/rγ , percolation can occur for
any arbitrarily large secrecy requirement ̺, while for bounded
models such as g(r) = 1/(1 + rγ), the desired ̺ may be too
high to allow percolation. Our results also show that as long
as ̺ < ̺max, percolation can be achieved even in cases where
the eavesdroppers are arbitrarily dense, by making the density
of legitimate nodes large enough.
Figure 12 shows the percolation probabilities for the weak
and strong components of the iS-graph, versus the density λℓ
of legitimate nodes. As predicted by Theorem 7.1, the figure
suggests that these components experience a phase transition
as λℓ is increased. In particular, λweakc ≈ 3.4m−2 and
λstrongc ≈ 6.2m−2, for the case of λe = 1m−2 and ̺ = 0. Op-
erationally, this means that if long-range bidirectional secure
communication is desired in a wireless network, the density
of legitimate nodes must be at least 6.2 times that of the
eavesdroppers. In practice, the density of legitimate nodes
must be even larger, because a secrecy requirement greater
than ̺ = 0 is typically required. This dependence on ̺ is
illustrated in Figure 13. In practice, it might also be of interest
to increase λℓ fairly beyond the critical density, since this leads
to an increased average fraction p⋄∞ of nodes which belong to
the infinite component, thus improving secure connectivity.
VIII. FULL CONNECTIVITY IN THE POISSON iS-GRAPH
In the previous section, we studied percolation in the
iS-graph defined over the infinite plane. We showed that for
some combinations of the parameters (λℓ, λe, ̺), the regime
is supercritical and an infinite component arises. However,
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
PSfrag replacements
pw
ea
k
∞
λℓ (m−2)
̺ = 0 ̺ = 1 ̺ = 2
Figure 13. Effect of the secrecy rate threshold ̺ on the percolation
probability pweak∞ (λe = 1m−2, g(r) = 1/r4, Pℓ/σ2 = 10).
the existence of an infinite component does not ensure con-
nectivity between any two nodes, e.g., one node inside the
infinite component cannot communicate with a node outside.
In this sense, percolation ensures only partial connectivity of
the network. In some scenarios, it is of interest to guarantee
full connectivity, i.e., that all nodes can communicate with
each other, possibly through multiple hops. Note, however, that
for networks defined over an infinite region, the probability
of full connectivity is exactly zero. Thus, to study of full
connectivity, we need to restrict our attention to a finite
region R. Throughout this section, we consider the simplest
case of ̺ = 0, i.e., the existence of secure links with a positive
(but possibly small) MSR.
A. Definitions
Since the iS-graph is a directed graph, we start by dis-
tinguishing between full out- and in-connectivity with the
following definitions.
Definition 8.1 (Full Out-Connectivity): A legitimate
node xi ∈ Πℓ ∩ R is fully out-connected with respect to
a region R if in the iS-graph G = {Πℓ, E} there exists a
directed path between xi and every node xj ∈ Πℓ ∩ R, for
xi 6= xj .
Definition 8.2 (Full In-Connectivity): A legitimate
node xi ∈ Πℓ ∩ R is fully in-connected with respect to
a region R if in the iS-graph G = {Πℓ, E} there exists a
directed path between every node xj ∈ Πℓ ∩ R and xi, for
xi 6= xj .
The iS-graph is a random graph, and therefore we can
consider the probabilities of a node xi being fully in- or out-
connected. For analysis purposes, we consider that a probe
legitimate node (node 0) placed at the origin of the coordinate
system, i.e., xprobe = 0 ⊂ R. We then define pout−con and
pin−con as the probability that node 0 is, respectively, fully out-
and fully in-connected. These probabilities are a deterministic
function of the densities λℓ and λe, and the area A of regionR.
Our goal is to characterize pout−con and pin−con.
B. Main Result
In what follows, we focus on the asymptotic behavior of
secure connectivity in the limit of a large density of legitimate
nodes.7 Specifically, for a fixed region of area A and a fixed
density λe of eavesdroppers, we would like to determine if
by increasing λℓ → ∞, we can asymptotically achieve full
in- and out-connectivity with probability 1.8 The following
theorem characterizes the asymptotic out-connectivity in the
iS-graph.
Theorem 8.1 (Asymptotic Out-Connectivity [49]): For the
Poisson iS-graph with λe > 0 and A > 0, we have
lim
λℓ→∞
pout−con = 1,
i.e., the legitimate node at the origin is asymptotically out-
connected.
The following theorem characterizes the asymptotic in-
connectivity in the iS-graph.
Theorem 8.2 (Asymptotic In-Connectivity [49]): For the
Poisson iS-graph with λe > 0 and A > 0, we have
lim
λℓ→∞
pin−con ≤ 1− 6π
8π + 3
√
3
(1 − e−λeA), (34)
i.e., the legitimate node at the origin is not asymptotically in-
connected.
The theorems show that full out-connectivity can be im-
proved as much as desired by deploying more legitimate
nodes. Full in-connectivity, however, remains bounded away
from 1, no matter how large λℓ is made (an intuitive explana-
tion for this fact is provided in [49]). Operationally, this means
that a node can a.a.s. transmit secret messages to all the nodes
in a finite region R, but cannot a.a.s. receive secret messages
from all the nodes in R.
IX. CONCLUSION
Using the notion of strong secrecy, we provided an
information-theoretic definition of the iS-graph as a model
for intrinsically secure communication in large-scale networks.
The iS-graph captures the connections that can be established
with MSR exceeding a threshold ̺, in a large network. This
paper provided an overview of the main properties of this new
class of random graphs.
Perhaps the most interesting insight to be gained from our
results, is the exact quantification of the impact of the eaves-
dropper density λe on secure connectivity—a modest density
of scattered eavesdroppers can potentially cause a drastic
reduction in the MSR provided at the physical layer of wireless
communication networks. Our work has not yet addressed all
of the far reaching implications of the broadcast property of
the wireless medium. In the most general scenario, legitimate
nodes could for example transmit their signals in a cooperative
fashion, whereas malicious nodes could use jamming to disrupt
all communications. We hope that further efforts in combining
stochastic geometry with information-theoretic principles will
lead to a more comprehensive treatment of wireless security.
7For a non-asymptotic analysis of secure full connectivity, see [49].
8We say that an event occurs “asymptotically almost surely” (a.a.s.) if its
probability approaches one as λℓ →∞.
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